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American and English criminal law is characterized by wider use of
strict liability than one finds in the criminal law of many European juris-
dictions. With respect to English law, scholars have suggested that the use
of lay juries explains the prevalence of strict liability offenses. This paper
investigates that idea in American law and finds some evidence for it.
Courts and legislatures sometimes worry that mens rea is difficult to prove
when the only available evidence is circumstantial-it must be inferred
from conduct and circumstances. Just as the evidence rules reflect a con-
cern with the limits of jurors' abilities to handle certain kinds of evidence,
the rules regarding strict liability as well as reverse burdens of proof (under
which defendants must prove defenses) manifest a concern that juries are
worse than judges at inferring culpability from available evidence. One
way to address this deficiency is to eliminate the requirement for mens rea
altogether.
But then what safeguards remain to ensure that only the culpable are
criminally punished? The answer in American law, broadly, is that adver-
sarial criminal procedure is thought to compensate for this deficiency in
substantive criminal law. Courts identify, somewhat obliquely, two proce-
dural components in particular: the use of prosecutorial discretion, and,
paradoxically, the jury. While courts are somewhat skeptical of the jury's
capacity to accurately recognize proof of culpability, they profess faith in
the lay jury's "common sense" instincts-or political judgments-to pre-
vent convictions of the non-culpable. On that view, strict liability addresses
the jury's weakness regarding a challenging issue of proof while the jury's
purportedly strong capacity for normative judgment, in turn, provides a
safeguard against unjustified punishment.
I. INTRODUCTION
LL American criminal law codes-as well as that of England-
include innumerable offenses that lack mens rea requirements
for one or more elements. The category of regulatory or public-
welfare offenses, which may have no mens rea requirement at all, is firmly
* O.M. Vicars Professor of Law and E. James Kelly, Jr. Class of 1965 Research Pro-
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established, but strict liability extends well beyond that class. The same is
true of procedural rules that in practical effect can be closely analogous
to strict liability offenses. "Reverse proof burdens" place the burden of
proving some fact relevant to blameworthiness and liability on defend-
ants rather than the state; they are especially common for so-called af-
firmative defenses such as self-defense.' Strict liability and reverse
burdens sometimes work in combination, highlighting their functional
similarity.2 For some offenses, the state's proof of a strict liability offense
might be defeated by a defendant who carries the burden of proving his
lack of culpability, e.g., by proving he used reasonable care.3 That struc-
ture converts strict liability, in effect, into a rebuttable presumption of
mens rea upon the prosecution's proof of actus reus.
This would seem curious if it were not so familiar. For one, both types
of rules undermine the culpability principle of actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea-no criminal liability without proof of fault, which is imple-
mented by requiring the state to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
union of conduct and blameworthy state of mind.4 For another, the
1. They are employed as well for issues external to culpability, such as statutes of
limitations. See Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 717 (2013) (affirming placement of
burden on defendant to prove withdrawal from conspiracy outside the statute of limita-
tions period).
Reverse proof burdens can take two forms. When defendants bear the burden of persua-
sion, the rule authorizes conviction unless the defendant proves the facts (e.g., use of force
in self-defense) on which he bears that burden. On this distinction, see Ct. of Ulster Cnty.
v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140,158 n.16 (1979). The burden of proof is widely placed on defendants
for many affirmative defenses such as self-defense, insanity, withdrawal from conspiracy,
and statute-of-limitations bars. See Smith, 133 S. Ct. at 719 (on conspiracy and statutes of
limitations claims, and issues that defeat liability by negating proof of required elements,
such as intoxication to negate specific intent). See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Ste-
phan, III, Defense, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325
(1979) (surveying such rules); George Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative
Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968) (same); Arthur Murphy,
The Intoxication Defense: An Introduction to Mr. Smith's Article, 76 DICK. L. REV. 1, 10
(1971-72) (noting Ohio law that puts burden of persuasion on defendants regarding intoxi-
cation); RICHARD J. BONNIE, ET AL. CRIMINAL LAw 230 (3rd ed. 2010) (estimating that
"[p]erhaps as many as half the states" place the burden of persuasion on defendants to
disprove specific intent with intoxication evidence). If the defendant bears only the burden
of production (or "going forward"), an issue is removed from consideration unless defen-
dant presents enough evidence to raise it as a factual dispute. See, e.g., People v. Cleaves,
229 Cal. App. 3d 367, 375 (4th App. Dist. 1991) (in homicide trial, affirming trial court's
refusal to give a jury instruction on lesser charge of assisting a suicide because defendant
had not met his burden to produce evidence providing "some basis" for the instruction).
2. A third procedural rule has a similar functional effect: Evidentiary presumptions,
or inferences, ease the state's burden of proof by authorizing judges and juries to find one
fact to be proven by inference from proof another fact. For example, an explicit rule may
inform juries that proof of possession of drugs (say, in defendant's car or luggage) permits
an inference of knowing possession.
3. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975) (strongly implying that a strict
liability offense permits a defense that defendant was "powerless to prevent" the prohib-
ited harm).
4. Fowler v. Padget, [1798] 7 Term Rep. 509, 101 ER 1103 (Lord Kenyon, C.J.) ("[I]t
is a principle of natural justice, and our law, that . . . [t]he intent and the act must both
occur to constitute the crime."). In Blackstone's description, for criminal liability "there
must be first a vicious will, and secondly an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious
will." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *21. See also United States v. Morissette,
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American and English criminal justice systems are fairly distinctive in this
respect. A generation ago, George Fletcher described how English,
American, and German criminal law systems in the nineteenth century all
relied on rules that placed the proof burden for some issues on defend-
ants. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, German reforms eventu-
ally did away with use of reverse-proof burdens. Fletcher initially thought
English and American law were headed the same way and that this repre-
sented a general shift in Western legal systems.5 But he subsequently
found Anglo-American reforms to be much more partial and ambiva-
lent;6 a few states abandoned use of reverse-burden rules that were estab-
lished in common law, but many never did. Nothing in the last thirty
years has changed Fletcher's picture of American or English criminal law
on this point. The story regarding strict liability is much the same.7 Ger-
man criminal law today rarely employs strict liability in crime definitions
and has no class of offenses equivalent to Anglo-American public welfare
crimes. Strict liability has diminished even in other common law coun-
tries, notably Canada.8
What accounts for the distinctiveness of Anglo-American criminal law
on these points? Perhaps the most significant explanation in the scholarly
literature, which is focused on strict liability, is that Anglo-American
criminal law operates on a different, weaker principle of culpability than
that which prevails in Germany or elsewhere. Both English and Ameri-
can scholars recognize that their criminal law does not abide by the "prin-
ciple of correspondence," which requires proof of fault for every material
element of an offense so that punishment is imposed in proportion to a
wrongdoer's culpability. Much of Anglo-American criminal law instead
follows a much weaker culpability premise, which requires only proof of
fault for some wrongdoing (e.g., an offense conduct element), after which
punishment may increase without regard for a wrongdoer's fault as to
342 U.S. 246, 254 (1952) (distinguishing ordinary crimes from regulatory or public-welfare
offences). See generally Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 1 (describing tensions between re-
verse burdens and evidentiary presumptions and requirements that the state prove individ-
ual culpability and extensively analyzing of case law).
5. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 7.2-7.3 (1978); George
Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Prac-
tices, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968).
6. In his 1968 article, Fletcher depicted Anglo-American common law as having
started down the same reform path as Germany. The U.S. was less far along that path, but
his implication was that the trend was uniform across western legal systems. When he took
up the same topic in his landmark book ten years later, he revised his assessment, recog-
nized U.S. reform had not progressed, and described a divergence of German and Anglo-
American criminal law on this point. Compare Fletcher, supra note 5, with FLETCHER,
supra note 5.
7. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 76 (6th ed. 2007) (strict
liability articles); Fletcher, supra note 5 (for reverse-burdens point).
8. See JEROEN BLOMSMA, MENS REA AND DEFENCES IN EUROPEAN CRIMINAL LAW
210-31 (Intersentia 2012) (analyzing use or rejection of strict liability in European com-
mon law and civil law states); Darryl K. Brown, Public Welfare Offenses, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW (Markus Dubber ed.) (forthcoming 2014) (comparing strict
liability usage in common law and European civil law jurisdictions and noting that Ger-
many uses civil rather than criminal sanctions for regulatory offenses).
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aggravating elements (e.g., unknown circumstances or unintended
results).9
But there is another possible explanation, suggested by English and
European scholars: We adopt strict criminal liability because we use lay
juries. "It seems very likely," Professors Spencer and Pedain have sug-
gested, "that a distrust of juries is an unspoken element that lies behind a
range of judicial decisions that, over the years, have made inroads on the
culpability principle."10 After describing German and French tribunals
dominated by professional judges, they conclude that "[o]n a practical
level, it is therefore easy to see why the need to prove fault at the trial
puts much less of a strain on the operation of the institutions of criminal
justice on the Continent than comparable requirements do in England.""
A German scholar also focused on English rather than American crimi-
nal process has recently suggested much the same. 12 The argument has
some intuitive appeal. Concern about proving facts arises against the
background of who decides whether facts are proven. Fears that certain
facts are hard to prove are partly concerns about fact finders rather than
evidence. If lawmakers think jurors are likely to get facts wrong, they can
often remove fact questions from jurors (strict liability), make facts easier
to find (evidentiary presumptions), or shift the risk of fact-finding error
onto defendants (reverse burdens).
My aim is to investigate this claim primarily in the context of American
criminal law, especially against more familiar and explicit justifications
for strict liability. My conclusion is that the jury is a contributing cause for
both the wide acceptance of strict liability and the use of reverse-proof
burdens for two broad reasons that I develop below. The first is that there
is much other evidence of our distrust of juries in American legal systems,
9. See ASHWORTH, supra note 1; VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 93-97
(2005); BLOMSMA, supra note 8, at 210-31 (discussing the correspondence principle in rela-
tion to strict liability). The correspondence principle is generally taken as aspirational,
rather than a descriptive, in English criminal law. Arguments for a weaker proportionality
principle suggest that a culpable wrongdoer may have forfeited an entitlement to punish-
ment in accord with fault due to a change in "normative position." See Jeremy Horder, A
Critique of the Correspondence Principle of Criminal Law, 1995 CRIM. L. REv. 759; see also
Kenneth W. Simons, Is Strict Criminal Liability in the Grading of Offenses Consistent with
Retributive Desert?, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 445 (2012) (describing and assessing non-
adherence to the correspondence principle in English and American criminal punishment);
Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Reform and the Persistence of Strict Liability, 62 DUKE
L.J. 289 (2012) (discussing the same, under the label "threshold liability"). One manifesta-
tion of this is the exceedingly weak requirement of proportional punishment in American
constitutional law, where proportionality limits are meaningful only at the extremes-
mostly regarding capital punishment and life incarceration of juvenile offenders. German
constitutional law, by contrast, includes a much stronger requirement of proportionality in
criminal punishment. On the latter, see Thomas Weigend & Jenia lontcheva Turner, The
Constitutionality of Negotiated Criminal Judgments in Germany, 15 GERMAN L.J. (2014),
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pagelD=11&artlD=1611.
10. Spencer & Pedain, Approaches to Strict and Constructive Liability in Continental
Criminal Law, in APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 273 (Andrew Simester, ed. 2005).
11. Spencer & Pedain, supra note 10, at 274.
12. See MATTIAs HOERSTER, DIE STRICT LIABILITY DES ENGLISCHEN STRAFRECHTS-
ZUGLEICH EINE GEGENUBERSTELLUNG MIT DEM DEUTSCHEN STRAF- UN ORDNUNG-
SWIDRIGKEITENRECr 29-44 (2009) (cited in Blomsma, supra note 8, at 208-20).
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so we should not be surprised that strict liability-and its functional coun-
terpart, reverse-proof burdens-finds a rationale in counteracting distrust
of an institution that cannot be fully abolished. The second, paradoxically,
rests a certain kind of trust in juries. The implication is that juries-and
our criminal procedure regime more broadly-make strict liability more
tolerable. Procedural requirements, including jury fact-finding authority,
help to alleviate anxieties about possible injustices from substantive crim-
inal laws that permit liability on the basis of insufficient culpability. That
calculus, in turn, reflects a larger American (perhaps Anglo-American)
reliance on procedure over substantive law as the primary safeguard
against injustice.
Part II recounts longstanding concerns about the difficulty of certain
kinds of facts and how strict liability, reverse proof burdens, and pre-
sumptions respond to those concerns. Part III describes the divergent as-
sumptions about juries' and judges' relative strengths and weaknesses.
Juries' political instincts and "common sense" garner more trust than that
of judges. But assumptions about juries' common-sense capacity for fact-
finding have some curious limits. On certain tough, factual issues, judges'
experience is thought to give them better insight to make accurate factual
inferences from circumstantial evidence. Part IV unpacks how these de-
vices address juries' perceived weaknesses at some risk to permitting pun-
ishment without fault. Part V argues that those risks are understood to be
minimized by the protections of adversarial process, common law prac-
tices, and constitutional criminal procedure.
II. WORRIES ABOUT JURIES
A. CONTRASTING TRADITIONS OF CRIMINAL JURIES
The traditions of criminal juries shared by all common law systems are
well entrenched in the federal and state constitutional law. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has often painted a rosy portrait of the criminal jury as "fun-
damental to the American scheme of justice" and "among those
'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions."" 3 Part of the jury's function rests on a
commitment to integrating lay citizens' common sense and judgment into
the adjudicative task of assessing evidence and finding facts. The jury
right rests on "insistence upon community participation in the determina-
tion of guilt or innocence" 14 and serves "to maintain a link between con-
temporary community values and the penal system . . . ."is But the jury
also serves a larger political purpose: "to prevent oppression by the Gov-
13. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 67 (1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14. Id. at 156.
15. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (also noting the state has a
strong interest in having the jury "express the conscience of the community on the ultimate
question of life or death."). See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62, 68-69 (2004)
(emphasizing the jury's role in assessing trial evidence).
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ernment"' 6 and "to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to
make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge
against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the
professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge."' 7
Jurors' advantages over judges, then, lie in their access to the common
sense of ordinary citizens and in a faith that their political judgment will
serve as a more reliable check on inappropriate enforcement efforts than
judges.
Despite this veneration of the criminal jury, constitutional doctrine and
the common law also contain a deep counter-tradition about juries that is
fully evident in American constitutional and statutory law. At least since
Wigmore, one site for this counter-tradition is the law of evidence, which
manifests considerable distrust of the jury's capabilities to assess evidence
and therefore to function as reliable fact-finders. Evidence law is replete
with complicated exclusionary rules, many of which are motivated by
worries that jurors will misuse or be misled by certain kinds of evidence.
Familiar examples include many forms of hearsay,' 8 information about a
defendant's prior criminal convictions,19 use of poor quality substitutes
for original documents (the "best evidence" rules), 20 and any probative
evidence that also would be unfairly prejudicial if misused. 21 Other rules
authorize evidence to assist jurors on topics not within ordinary lay
knowledge. An obvious example is certain kinds of expert testimony,
such as that on "social frameworks" or eyewitness reliability, which is
intended to improve jurors' judgments on issues about which contextual
knowledge is usually thin or misconceptions are widespread.22
These concerns extend to sources of information beyond admissible ev-
idence. Rules against exposure to publicity about the case before and
during trial also reflect a similar judgment about jurors' inabilities to as-
sess the reliability of sources or to disregard irrelevant information.23
Other rules outside the evidence code likewise rest on a dim view of ju-
16. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155.
17. Taylor, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56). See also Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (the jury "guard[s] against a spirit of oppres-
sion and tyranny on the part of rulers [and serves] as the great bulwark of civil and political
liberties"); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30, 32 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (describing the jury as "the spinal column of American democracy"
with a political role that responds to the Founders' "healthy suspicion of the power of
government"); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004) (describing the jury system
as following from the view that "judges, like other government officers, could not always
be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people").
18. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
19. See FED. R. EVID. 609.
20. See FED. R. EVID. 1003.
21. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
22. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Sci-
ence in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987). These tools do not resolve all concerns about thejury's weaknesses. We still worry about juries faced with the complexities of large-scale
litigation governed by complicated laws, and some worry about the "CSI effect," although
there seems to be little firm evidence of that effect.
23. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L R. 3.6 (2011).
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rors' capacities, including those that restrict attorney comments that ap-
peal to racial or other forms of prejudice. 24 Even longstanding bars
against juror note-taking during trial or written copies of jury instructions
during deliberations rest on fears that jurors cannot handle these simple
tools and somehow will be led astray by them. 2 5 In a different respect,
speculation that jurors suffer from a "CSI effect" 26-that they bring to
the courtroom unrealistic expectations for forensic evidence-arises from
a presumed naivet6 that we do not attribute to professional judges. 27 And
the dark side of juries' oft-praised power to nullify (to acquit despite evi-
dence proving guilt) is that jurors sometimes have done so for bad rea-
sons, such as racial bias.28
The full picture of the lay jury, then, is somewhat Janus-faced, though it
may have an arguable underlying coherence. Juries are poor bodies to
determine and define law (a power they lost in the late-nineteenth cen-
tury)29 but well-suited for political judgments that are sometimes inher-
ent in applications of criminal law to particular cases. And while they are
generally capable of assessing the credibility of most witness and certain
other sources of evidence,30 they are susceptible to being misled by emo-
tion or prejudice. On top of that, courts are skeptical of their capacity to
identify proof of fault when it requires strong inferences from evidence of
conduct and circumstances.
B. STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES OF JUDGES
Judges, of course, have a different mix of abilities and weaknesses. The
common law tradition and American constitutional doctrine hold a spe-
cial concern about judges' potential political bias, or their relative weak-
ness (compared to juries), as a check on prosecutors. On the other hand,
the common law places great trust in judges to interpret law (and to make
common law) and to explain the law to juries. Somewhat less noted, there
is also considerable trust in judges as fact-finders. Despite worries about
judges' pro-government bias, a number of rules reflect a greater trust in
judges' cognitive capacities as compared to lay jurors. Judges, to a greater
24. See id. R. 8.3[3].
25. See United States v. Causey, 748 F.3d 310, 316 (7th Cir. 2014).
26. Kathleen Keough Griebel & Fred Zain, The CSI Effect, and a Philosophical Idea
of Justice: Using West Virginia as a Model for Challenge, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 1155 (2012);
The "CSI effect," THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 2010, at 77; Jeffrey Toobin, The CSI Effect,
THE NEW YORKER, May 7, 2007, at 30.
27. Griebel & Zain, supra note 26, at 1155.
28. See PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A Hip-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 57-73
(2009) (discussing race-based jury nullification); Doug Linder, Jury Nullification (2001),
available at http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/nullification.html.
29. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 97 (1895).
30. See, e.g., Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) ("We are content to rely
upon the good sense and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of
untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they
cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some question-




degree than jurors, are governed by rules that trust them to disregard
irrelevant information and to sort out unreliable or legally impermissible
information. Judges face few, if any, limits related to their exposure to
publicity,3 ' and they are more trusted than juries to properly decide cases
even after exposure to inadmissible evidence; judges can rule on admissi-
bility and still preside over trial.32 Another example is implied in the rule
of Bruton v. United States,33 which held that jurors cannot be trusted to
obey an instruction to consider evidence of a defendant's confession
against only that defendant but not his co-defendant in a joint trial. We
trust only judges to handle the challenging cognitive task of disregarding
known evidence when the evidence is of sufficient significance. The same
is true of the Jackson v. Denno rule: juries cannot be trusted to determine
whether a confession was voluntary and then, if they were to find it was
coerced, to disregard it.34
C. JUDICIAL COMMENTS AND FORMAL EVIDENTIARY INFERENCES
These rules reveal a faith that professional judges have greater cogni-
tive capacities of a certain sort than lay jurors. They are part of a common
law tradition that takes judges to be in some respects better at assessing
evidence than jurors and better at drawing inferences and accurately de-
termining facts. This point is probably less acknowledged in the United
States than in England, where the tradition of judicial commentary on
evidence remains stronger. But even American law on judicial comments
to jurors makes this apparent. The Supreme Court repeatedly has af-
firmed the power of the trial judge "to assist the jury in arriving at a just
conclusion by explaining and commenting upon the evidence, [and] by
drawing their attention to the parts of it which he thinks important," in-
cluding by "express[ing] his opinion upon the facts."35 In a classic article,
Ronald Allen argued that such judicial comments should be understood
31. In contrast, judges can be disqualified (or should recuse themselves) when some
relationship creates the appearance of potential bias, such as ownership of stock in a cor-
porate party, prior involvement in a case as one party's attorney, or (in some cases) having
previously accepted financial assistance or contributions from litigants. See, e.g., Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 870 (2009).
32. To be sure, juries are asked to do some of this challenging cognitive work, as well,
through evidentiary doctrines that instruct juries to disregard evidence that was wrongly
admitted or to use evidence only for one issue but not another.
33. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
34. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 382 (1964).
35. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (citing inter alia Vicksburg &
M.R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553 (1886)); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394
(1933) ("A federal judge may analyze the evidence, comment upon it, and express his
views with regard to the testimony of witnesses. ... [T]he power of the judge to express an
opinion as to the guilt of the defendant exists, [but] it should be exercised cautiously and
only in exceptional cases."); Horning v. Dist. of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920)
(judge's opinion to jury that defendant was guilty did not require reversal when facts were
admitted and undisputed); Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 622-23 (1894); Simmons v.
United States, 142 U. S. 148, 155 (1891) (no error by judge who denied deadlocked jury's
request to be discharged and told them "that he regarded the testimony as convincing"); cf
Wong v. Smith, 131 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari and
describing case law trial judges' discretion to assist jurors by commenting on evidence).
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as another means to provide information to the jury, beyond formal evi-
dence, and also (when comments aid the prosecution) as a functional ad-
justment in the burden of persuasion. 36
Much the same can be said of formal rules about evidentiary infer-
ences, which are conveyed to juries through instructions. Inference rules
authorize and encourage specific factual inferences from certain kinds of
evidence.3 7 One example is the rule that the proof of possession of con-
traband authorizes an inference of knowing possession;38 another is that
proof of possession of stolen property is sufficient to infer intent to per-
manently deprive the owner of the property.39 Judicial comments and evi-
dentiary inferences both reflect a judgment, as Allen put it, "that certain
facts usually present themselves in a certain relationship, a relationship
that may not be known by the jury." 40 The U.S. Supreme Court has en-
dorsed this idea of juries in a number of decisions that approve of both
judicial comments and factual presumptions.41 "A valid presumption" of
one fact from proof of another may, as the Court has put it, "be created
upon a view of relation broader than that a jury might take in a specific
case."42 That line of authority accords with a longer common law
tradition.43
Behind the practice of both judicial comments and instructions on such
inferences is an idea that judges (and legislatures, when they codify evi-
36. Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified
Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REv. 321, 349-51, n.104
(1980); see also Renee Lettow Lerner, New Trial for Verdict against Law: Judge-Jury Rela-
tions in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 505 (1996) (describ-
ing various means of judicial influence over jury decisions in 18th and 19th centuries).
37. "In the criminal law, presumptions are used to encourage the jury to find certain
facts, with respect to which no direct evidence is presented, solely because other facts have
been proved . . . . The purpose of such presumptions is plain: Like certain other jury in-
structions, they provide guidance for jurors' thinking in considering the evidence laid
before them. . . . Through the use of presumptions, certain inferences are commended to
the attention of jurors by legislatures or courts." Ct. of Ulster Cnty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140,
168-69 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
38. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 854 (1973) (affirming a jury instruction
on such a presumption).
39. See, e.g., State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 793 (Iowa 1999) (Carter, J., dissent-
ing) (citing cases); State v. Rosewell, 239 N.W.2d 171, 173-74 (Iowa 1976). For examples in
federal statutes, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1466(b) (2012) (offering to sell two or more obscene
articles at one time, or five or more at different times, creates a rebuttable presumption
that one is in the business of selling obscene matter); 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b) (2012) (presence
at distillery business is sufficient basis to infer one carries on the business of distillery); 26
U.S.C. § 5681(d) (2012) (presence at distillery is sufficient basis to infer one works at
distillery).
40. Allen, supra note 36, at 350.
41. See Barnes, 412 U.S. at 841-46 (citing decisions on evidentiary presumptions);
Quercia, 289 U.S. at 469 (citing decisions on judicial comments).
42. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468 (1943) (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
See also Morrison v. California, 291 US 82, 90 (1934) (evidentiary presumptions properly
rest on "the teachings of experience").
43. MATFHEw HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, 291, 292 (Charles
Gray ed., 1971) (describing the trial judge as "able ... in matters of fact to give [jurors] a
great light and assistance by his weighing the evidence before them and observing where
the question and knot of the business lies and by showing them his opinion even in matter
of fact which is a great advantage and light to laymen.").
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dentiary presumptions) may have superior insight, background knowl-
edge, or "common sense" regarding certain challenging instances of fact-
finding that jurors do not have. More bluntly, judges can interpret certain
kinds of evidence better than jurors. Judges can gain from experience a
better ability to draw these factual inferences accurately-a capacity
analogous to the "situation sense" that Karl Llewellyn suggested judges
possess with regard to legal judgment.44 This is one instance of the gen-
eral theory that human cognition works through "pattern recognition."
Experts have better judgment because they have acquired large invento-
ries of patterns or prototypes that allow quick recognition, or cognitive
"explanations," for discrete examples.45
Judicial comments and factual-inference instructions are both ways for
professionals to assist lay fact-finders and so reveal an anxiety about ju-
ries' capacity to carry out their central task. Worries about judges' politi-
cal bias remains; they go too far with these tools and infringe upon the
jury's fact-finding autonomy. That concern likewise runs through the case
law on evidentiary inferences and judicial comments, and it led many
states in the nineteenth century to limit judicial comment by statute.46
But the central point is that American courts, following the common law
tradition, have long perceived deficiencies in juries' fact-finding abilities
that judges are not thought to share. Those deficiencies play a role in the
persistence of strict liability, as well.
III. JURY WEAKNESSES AND STRICT LIABILITY
A. STRICT LIABILITY AND MENS REA PROOF PROBLEMS
Save where there is evidence in the form of confessions (including in-
advertent ones acquired, for example, from incriminating recordings or
emails), evidence of a defendant's mental state must be proven by cir-
cumstantial evidence-the sort of inferential fact-finding at which juries
44. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 204
(1960).
45. HOWARD MARGOLIS, PATTERNS, THINKING & COGNITION & DEALING WITH RISK:
A THEORY OF JUDGMENT (1987). A classic example is "chicken sexing"-the ability of
experienced workers to sort young chicks by gender by sight when most people perceive no
difference in the chicks' genitalia. Dan M. Kahan, Science Communication & Judicial-Neu-
trality Communication Look the Same to Me, The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law
School, Nov. 16, 2012, http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2012/11/16/science-communi
cation-judicial-neutrality-communication-look.html. Police and prosecutors have a similar
base of experience to inform their common-sense judgments. Likewise, lawmakers may
gain something analogous from the process of legislative fact-finding; at least, that seems to
be their conclusion when they codify particular evidentiary presumptions.
46. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 405 (1970) (disapproving instruc-
tion authorizing factual inference); Quercia, 289 U.S. at 468 (disapproving judicial com-
ment); Murdock, 290 U.S. at 394 (urging caution in judicial comments to juries relating to
guilt in criminal cases); Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1990)
("Comments by the judge require reversal if the judge expresses his opinion on an ultimate
issue of fact in front of the jury . . . ."). More generally, see Renee Lettow-Lerner, The
Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
195, 245-48, 261 (2000) (describing 19th century state legislation to restrict the judicial
comments on evidence in criminal and civil cases).
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are presumed to be especially weak. Given that, it is easy to see how strict
liability operates as a stronger means to solve the same problem that evi-
dentiary inferences and judicial comments address-the problem is that
juries do not properly recognize inferential facts in the record. Instead of
guiding jurors to that inference, strict liability eliminates the need for any
inference. If judges always served as fact-finders, their greater abilities to
recognize inferential evidence of mens rea would reduce the need for
strict liability offenses (and perhaps codified factual presumptions as
well) .47
It is important to recognize that strict liability need not necessarily im-
pose liability without fault. In some offenses, it plausibly operates instead
as an irrebuttable presumption of culpability upon proof of conduct, re-
sult, and circumstance elements of the offense. When that presumption is
valid, strict liability increases the odds not simply of a conviction, but of a
conviction for culpable offenders. One rationale for strict liability in such
cases is that a traditional mens rea requirement would risk frustrating ap-
propriate liability because proof of culpability is likely to be overlooked.
That risk is greater if we believe that culpability is especially difficult for
jurors to recognize. This does not, in my view, account for all strict liabil-
ity offenses. But it describes a substantial portion of them, at least if one
accepts recklessness or negligence as sufficient culpability for criminal lia-
bility, as the law in nearly all U.S. states and in England does. 48
There is plenty of evidence that legislatures and judges authorize strict
liability when they conclude that proof-of-conduct elements raise a strong
inference of culpability and-somewhat paradoxically-that culpability
would be hard for the state to prove.4 9 In decisions on public-welfare or
regulatory offenses, courts have long cited "difficulty of proof of knowl-
edge" as justifying strict liability,50 yet they add that these offenses ad-
47. Even for judicial fact-finding, we might retain formal rules of inference because we
worry about inconsistency in decision-making across cases that these clear-rule strategies
could minimize.
48. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(2011) (liability requires at least negligence "with respect to each element described by the
statute"); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(1), (2) (2011) (same); see also H.L.A. Hart, Negli-
gence, Mens rea, and Criminal Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 136
(1968) (defending negligence as an adequate form of fault).
49. The arguable paradox is that if culpability is so easy to infer from proof of conduct,
then it is hard also to conclude that the state would have trouble proving it. The paradox
diminishes only on a strong assumption that juries would have a hard time seeing the infer-
ence, even though lawyers, judges, and legislators do not. As the examples discussed imme-
diately below suggest, it is not clear that assumption is well-founded.
50. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922). The seminal strict-liability deci-
sion R v. Woodrow, [1846] 15 M. & W. 404,153 Eng. Rep. 907, widely cited by English and
American courts, made the same point about the difficulty of proving mens rea when
preventing the harm targeted by the statute is of special importance: "[T]he public incon-
venience would be much greater, if in every case the officers were obliged to prove knowl-
edge. They would be very seldom able to do so." For more recent decisions making the
same point; see Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607, 619 (1994); People v. Stanley,
921 N.E.2d 445, 452-54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); State v. T.R.D., 942 A.2d 1000 (Conn. 2008)(making the felony of failing to register as a sex offender a strict liability offense "ensures
that a sex offender will not be able to defeat prosecution . . . 'simply by claiming he did not
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dress "a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is subject
to stringent public regulation and may seriously threaten the community's
health or safety," which suggests that defendants who breach such regula-
tions are at least negligent.51
A few examples make the point. For the offense of possessing an illegal
weapon in the form of a "sawed off" shotgun, prosecutors must prove a
defendant knowingly possessed the weapon but not that he knew the
gun's barrel length was shorter than eighteen inches.52 Yet anyone who
knowingly possesses a weapon surely is aware of its barrel length in a
general sense, and one possessing an eighteen-inch barrel is very likely
aware, if not of its precise length, at least that it is much shorter than a
typical shotgun. From that, it is easy to conclude that one who possesses
an eighteen-inch-long shotgun is reckless as to the risk that the barrel is
unlawfully short. Proof of knowing possession provides the basis to infer
recklessness culpability as to barrel length. This was the Supreme Court's
point with regard to possession of hand grenades in United States v.
Freed.53 Strict liability for failure to meet a duty to register such a weapon
raises an inference of negligence or worse "on the theory that one would
hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an
innocent act." 54 In other offenses the inference may be stronger. The of-
fense of "bookmaking" (defined as "the business of receiving or paying
off bets") has been held to be a strict-liability crime.55 One is hard-
pressed to imagine a bookmaker who unknowingly receives and pays
gambling bets; proof of the conduct reliably proves state of mind. Indeed,
mens rea so obviously accompanies proof of conduct in such cases that
strict liability may be superfluous because mens rea is so easy for prosecu-
tors to prove-unless one is worried about juries missing easy inferences
that judges and lawyers do not.
A final example can be found in the federal offense of carrying fire-
arms during commission of another crime, which carries a five-year mini-
mum sentence. The statute increases the minimum to ten years for
discharging the firearm.56 In Dean v. United States, where it was undis-
puted that the defendant knowingly carried a gun during a bank robbery
and accidentally discharged it, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "dis-
know about [the registration requirement], or that he unintentionally overlooked its re-
quirements"); State v. Jordan, 733 N.E.2d 601, 606-07 (Ohio 2000); R v. Sheppard [2003] 1
CR. App. R. 35 (RoSE L.J.) (interpreting Trade Marks Act 1994, § 91(2)(c) and noting
mens rea is difficult and costly to prove); R v. Wholesale Travelers Grp. [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154,
246-47 (Cory, J.) (Can.) (same).
51. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985); see also United States v. Int'l
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (reasoning that when dangerous prod-
ucts or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great
that anyone who is aware of possessing them is presumed to also be aware of the
regulation).
52. Jordan, 733 N.E.2d at 607.
53. 401 U.S. 601, 609 (1977).
54. Id.
55. State v. Wac, 428 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ohio 1981).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012).
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charging" was a strict liability element.5 7 Here, too, strict liability attaches
only where the state's proof inferentially demonstrates some level of cul-
pability. One who knowingly carries a weapon to a bank robbery is al-
most certainly at least reckless as to its loaded status and at least
negligent as to its unintended discharge. One may disagree that negli-
gence is sufficient culpability for such a sentence enhancement, but strict
liability is unlikely to be imposed on actors who used reasonable care as
to the strict liability element.
In all these cases, legislatures or courts might have used a device other
than strict liability to resolve the challenge of a culpable mental state that
they feared jurors could not easily infer. They might assist the state in
proving culpable mental states through an evidentiary presumption, or by
relying on judges' comments to guide jurors to that inference, or they
might put the burden of proof on defendant to show a non-culpable
mental state, making strict liability in effect a rebuttable presumption. For
offenses in which strict liability follows this usage-proof of conduct
raises a reliable inference of culpability-strict liability is merely a
stronger device than these alternatives for addressing the challenge to ju-
rors of making that inference. In this sense, concerns about juries lie be-
hind uses of strict liability.
Even if one accepts that strict liability in some offenses such as these
applies only to actors whose conduct reveals their culpability, it is cer-
tainly the case that, across the broader field of strict liability offenses, this
assumption does not always hold. Courts concede as much in offenses
ranging from those with strict liability elements regarding a minor vic-
tim's age (as in sexual conduct or illicit drug offenses) to regulatory of-
fenses regarding mislabeled drugs and the like.58 Strict liability serves
aims other than solving difficulties of proving mens rea, notably deter-
rence, providing special protection to certain interests, and mitigating the
magnitude of harms that follow from certain conduct.59 Sometimes when
emphasizing these justifications for strict liability, courts acknowledge
their potential for injustice, which is to say punishing the non-culpable. In
the context of these risks, we find intimations of a different relationship
57. 556 U.S. 568, 575 (2009).
58. Some states have general statutes dictating that "[ciriminal intent does not require
proof of knowledge of the age of a minor even though age is a material element in the
crime in question." See MINN. STAT. § 609.02(9) (2009); Wis. STAT. § 939.23(6) (2005); see
also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5204(b) (Supp. 2011) ("Proof of a culpable mental state does
not require proof . .. that the accused had knowledge of the age of a minor, even though
age is a material element of the crime with which the accused is charged."); N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 15.20(3) (2009) ("[K]nowledge by the defendant of the age of [a] child is not an
element of any ... offense and it is not, unless expressly so provided, a defense ... that the
defendant did not know the age of the child . . . ."). For a public welfare offense regarding
mislabeled drugs, see United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 283 (1943).
59. See, e.g., State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 365 (Or. 2007) (strict liability justified by
statute's goal "to protect children from drug use"); Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 666-67
(Colo. 2000) (citing, inter alia, the statute's purpose to protect victims as a reason not to
infer a requirement that the defendant knows a minor's age in the offense of "contributing
to the delinquency of a minor"); State v. Ward, 637 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(justifying strict liability on the statute's "purpose of protecting children in schools").
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between strict liability and the jury, one in which the assumptions shift
from the jury's incompetence on particular evidential tasks to its compar-
ative advantage in recognizing the impropriety of convicting the
blameless.
IV. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AGAINST
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
When strict liability works, not as a means to ensure conviction of the
culpable, but as a device serving instrumental ends that also threatens the
blameless, substantive criminal law fails to abide by the actus non facit
principle. More bluntly, it permits liability on the blameless or dispropor-
tionate liability on culpable offenders. As the Court put it in United States
v. Balint, regarding a strict liability felony drug offense, "Congress
weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an innocent seller to a penalty
against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the drug,
and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided." 60
(English courts likewise have long admitted that strict liability "may pro-
duce mischief in individual cases" by punishing actors who are not at
fault.61) American criminal justice accepts some injustice to non-culpable
actors under strict liability in the name of instrumental ends. Yet it is also
unwilling to abandon the culpability principle, nor does it expect that
strict criminal liability will in practice have widespread effects of punish-
ing blameless actors. The solution is to find and safeguard against injus-
tice, not in criminal law, but in criminal procedure.
American criminal justice is characterized by a strong-at least a for-
mally strong-set of constitutionalized procedures intended to protect
defendants subjected to criminal prosecution, all of which are found, with
moderate doctrinal variations, in England and other common-law nations
as well. The Sixth Amendment alone includes the right to a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury, limits on the district from which jurors may be
drawn, and rights to sufficient notice regarding charges, to present evi-
dence through compulsory process, to confront state witnesses, and to be
assisted by defense counsel. The Fifth Amendment adds guarantees to an
indictment by a grand jury for serious crimes, limited double jeopardy
protections against being tried or punished twice for the same offense,
and the right not to testify. The Eighth Amendment adds limited protec-
tions against excessive bail requirements before trial and against exces-
sive punishment after conviction. 62 Over the last several decades, the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have become
sources of further protections, notably the bar on involuntary confessions,
the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants, and
60. U.S. v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253-254 (1922).
61. State v. Bait. & Susq. Steam Co., 13 Md. 181, 187 (1859); R v. Woodrow, 15 M. &
W. at 417.
62. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VII & XIV; see also art. III § 2 ("The trial of all
crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury").
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the state's high standard of proof, and limits on racially motivated juror
selection and (formally, though not practically) prosecutorial charging
discretion.63 Most of these federal provisions (save the grand jury) apply
in state as well as federal courts. State governments duplicate most in
their own constitutions and sometimes add additional safeguards (such as
a right to bail). 64 Statutory law further regulates the criminal process by
specifying evidence discovery and disclosure powers, allocating peremp-
tory strikes to parties during jury selection, granting multiple opportuni-
ties for appellate review, and more.
These procedural guarantees, rooted in traditions of the common law
and adversarial process, are less distinctive as compared to other criminal
process elsewhere than they once were. The post-World War II European
Convention on Human Rights includes a substantially similar set of guar-
antees (with the notable exception of the right to a jury trial).65 But the
United States from its beginning has favored a distinctive reliance on pro-
cedure rather than substantive limits or requirements-in particular, ad-
versarial procedure-as a bulwark against unjust criminal punishment.
The familiar story is that the animating purpose of constitutional criminal
procedure is to serve as safeguard against government abuse of power
and thereby protect individual liberty and to effectuate the constitutional
commitment to democratic governance in the judicial branch and the ad-
judication process. 66 To fulfill these ambitions, constitutional procedural
requirements-in the view of many, notably including some recent jus-
tices-implicitly mandate core features of adversarial, rather than inquisi-
torial, adjudication process. The inference (and premise) is that
adversarial process itself provides strong protections to defendants. 67 In
general, especially in the wake of Warren Court era, the dominant narra-
tive of American criminal justice, for most Supreme Court justices and
some commentators, is that criminal defendants enjoy strong (perhaps
excessively strong) procedural protections. 68
63. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 95 n.5 (1963); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 358(1970); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456, 464 (1996).
64. Adriana Lindermayer, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of
the State Constitutional Right to Bail, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 267 (2009) (exploring the right
to bail across several states).
65. BRITISH INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, BRITISH INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
FACT SHEET: THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2013), http://www.bihr
.org.uk/sites/default/files/BIHRECHR6OAnnFactsheet_0.pdf.
66. AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES(1997).
67. David Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634 (2009); Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
68. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1413 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Albert Alschuler, Lafler and
Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, 51 DUQUESNE L. REV. 673 (2013) (crit-
icizing Scalia on this point). For an argument about excessive criminal procedure protec-
tions, see Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. L.
REV. 387 (1996). For a Supreme Court description of trade-offs between constitutional
rights and effective criminal law enforcement, see, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,623 (2002).
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This regime of procedural safeguards is accompanied by the Constitu-
tion's notable lack of parameters for substantive criminal law or punish-
ment. Save for limits that follow as corollaries from guarantees of free
expression, gun ownership, or personal privacy, the Constitution places
almost no constraints on what legislators may criminalize or how they
may define offenses. 69
This combination of strong procedural protections and weak limita-
tions on substantive criminal law reveals the American strategy for
guarding against the risks posed by strict liability (and also reverse-proof
burdens)-the risks that liability will not correspond with culpability. Our
criminal justice system relies comparatively more on procedure and com-
paratively less on criminal law to prevent unjustified punishment. Judges
and legislators take criminal procedure as a substantial and largely suffi-
cient means to prevent the injustice of criminal liability without culpabil-
ity, even under a criminal code that formally authorizes it. If procedural
protections provide a meaningful bulwark against government punishing
the non-culpable, then strict criminal liability poses less risk of injustice;
mens rea requirements, on this view, can seem like an unnecessarily re-
dundant safeguard. Moreover, they would be costly ones. As we have
noted, strict liability removes difficult proof problems the state would
otherwise face. It also helps to solve, in the Supreme Court's view, inevi-
table challenges of legislative drafting-the "treacherous[ness]" and
"mischievous futility" of trying to codify precisely "a formula embracing
the variety of conduct" targeted by certain offenses. 70 In those offenses
for which proof of conduct alone demonstrates culpability, creating those
proof problems (by adding mens rea requirements) could mean frustrat-
ing the state's ability to convict the culpable and the broader public inter-
est in effective law enforcement. If one accepts the premise that criminal
procedure already provides sufficient protection against injustice, that
frustration is unnecessary. We don't need uniform, stringent mens rea re-
quirements on top of a strong procedural regime.
Thus, while some nations-notably Germany but also Canada, which
shares with the United States a system of adversarial process with com-
mon law juries-have largely abolished strict criminal liability, as well as
reverse proof burdens, in reforms aimed at reducing risks of unjust pun-
ishment, the American criminal justice system (like that of England)
69. For examples of substantive limits on criminalization, see, e.g., McDonald v. Chi-
cago, 561 U.S. 3025, 3110 (2010) (second amendment restricts state regulation of private
gun ownership); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 465 (2010) (overturning federal
crime for depictions of animal cruelty); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (strik-
ing down criminal prohibition of sodomy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480
(1965) (invalidating criminal prohibition on contraceptives for married persons); Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962) (rejecting criminalization of drug addiction as a
personal status). For examples of substantive limits on punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, see, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (barring death penalty
for offenders under age 18); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (barring death
penalty for mentally retarded offenders). See also U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3 (prohibiting
"corruption of blood"-limits on inheritance rights-as a sanction for treason).
70. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943).
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seems confident that the strength of its procedural regime prevents most
of the excesses made possible by reliance on strict liability.
If that is true, what procedural components in particular do courts ex-
pect to provide much of this protection from the potential injustice of
strict criminal liability? The two most significant are also two that may
seem the most implausible. One is prosecutorial discretion. The other is
the very institution whose dubious fact-finding abilities contribute to the
need for strict liability in the first place: the jury.
Prosecutors can be a safeguard against unjust strict liability because
they have discretion to withhold charges unless justified by policy or pub-
lic interest as well as factual sufficiency. Broad prosecutorial discretion is
the longstanding tradition in the all common law countries (and some
civil law ones).7 1 That discretion is especially strong in the United
States. 72 And courts take this broad executive authority as a safeguard
against the implications of strict liability rather than an avenue through
which it might be exploited. U.S. courts, despite occasionally expressing
concerns about abuses of prosecutorial power in other settings, generally
assume that prosecutors will use their discretion prudently so as not to
charge strict liability crimes unless merited by defendant's culpability. In-
stead of worrying that strict liability will be the prosecutor's instrument
for abuse, prosecutorial discretion is viewed as a safeguard that makes
strict liability feasible. The solution for the overbreadth of strict liability,
the Supreme Court has noted, is the criminal justice system's reliance on
the "conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers." 7 3 Legisla-
tures draft strict liability crimes and other overbroad offenses "against a
background assumption of prosecutorial discretion." 74
Additionally, courts continue to trust juries as well-especially with the
aid of trial judges-to prevent injustices from strict liability offenses, de-
spite skepticism about jurors' abilities to handle certain fact-finding chal-
lenges and evidentiary inferences. The judicial logic is unclear on this
point, but it seems to rest in part on a sense that juries are more likely to
err by acquitting (as when they inaccurately fail to infer a defendant's
71. The oft-cited English statement of this principle was made by Lord Shawcross
while Attorney General: "It has never been the rule in this country-I hope it never will
be-that suspected criminal offences must automatically be the subject of prosecution."
See Office of the DPP, http://www.dpp.gov.fj/default.aspx?page=decisionProsec [original
citation: House of Commons Debates, Official Report, 29 Jan. 1951; Vol. 483, col. 681.]
[Alternate cite: Gary Slapper & David Kelly, The English Legal System: 2009-2010, availa-
ble on books.google.com] For an international survey of prosecutorial authority; see Erik
Luna & Marianne L. Wade, eds., The Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective (2012).
72. English courts exercise occasional authority to overturn charging or non-charging
decisions in circumstances and on grounds that American judges would not. See R (on
application of Guest) v. D.P.P. E.W.H.C. 594 (2009); R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners,
ex parte Mead 1 All ER 772 (1993) (review of decision to prosecute); R v. Gen. Council of
the Bar, ex parte Percival 3 All ER 137 (1990) (review of non-prosecution decision); see
also C. Hilson, Discretion to Prosecute and Judicial Review, CRIM. L.R. 739 (1993).
73. Nash v. United States, 229 US 373, 378 (1913), quoted in Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at
285.
74. Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2102, 2107 n.3 (2009).
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culpable mental state from circumstantial evidence) than by convicting
when a defendant is insufficiently culpable. This is in my view a dubious
assumption for which there is little or no empirical evidence, but courts
generally seem not to share that skepticism. And the opposing view is a
rational one: Juries may have certain fact-finding deficiencies yet at the
same time retain a reliable "common sense" regarding whether a prose-
cution is just (i.e., whether conviction is deserved). On this view, jurors'
normative instincts-or, put differently, political judgment-provide a
safeguard against unjust conviction even though jurors' weaker fact-find-
ing abilities with respect to mental states means they will sometimes over-
look evidence of mens rea that judges would recognize. This vision of jury
competency makes sense of the Supreme Court's confidence that strict
liability will lead to just outcomes despite its obvious risks. We can rest
easy, the Court assures us, because strict liability's application is overseen
by "the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and
the ultimate judgment of juries."75
In sum, strict liability offenses, along with reverse-burden rules, endure
because confidence in the procedural regime reduces the need for greater
precision in substantive law. In fact, when faced with the fact that Anglo-
American criminal law employs strict liability far more broadly than one
finds elsewhere, American lawyers, judges,. and policymakers nonetheless
might not concede that their system has a weaker commitment to punish-
ing on the basis of culpability than does the criminal justice system in
Germany or elsewhere. They might instead have confidence that the com-
mon law and adversarial process traditions provide a different route to
achieving that same objective.
V. CONCLUSION
It seems that a curious combination of anxiety about and confidence in
the lay jury has played a role in sustaining Anglo-American strict criminal
liability. The jury is surely not the only reason for the persistence of these
rules in Anglo-American criminal law. It might not even be a necessary
one inasmuch as, if we had no juries, other reasons still might prove suffi-
cient to justify some instances of strict liability. Especially when it is re-
buttable, strict liability (like reverse burdens generally) encourages
defendants to produce evidence that is sometimes in their singular con-
75. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285. Note that the reliance here on the "judgment of
juries" illustrates confidence that they will appropriately favor defendants. Elsewhere, the
concern about jurors' competence in fact-finding is also one in which jurors will favor de-
fendants-but inappropriately, as a result of fact-finding errors. See also Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 296 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Our criminal justice system runs
on the premise that prosecutors will respect, and courts will enforce, the boundaries on
criminal conduct set by the legislature."); Smith v. United States, 411 U.S. 952, 954 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting "the virtually unreviewable
prosecutorial discretion concerning the initiation and scope of a criminal prosecution");
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 452 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting "our tradition
of virtually unreviewable prosecutorial discretion concerning the initiation and scope of a
criminal prosecution").
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trol. Perhaps, jurisdictions in which law enforcement has greater abilities
to interrogate defendants have less need for such devices (although the
practical abilities of American officials to interrogate and eavesdrop on
suspects despite the privilege against self-incrimination may leave little
left to be gained from an additional power to question suspects under
oath). Anglo-American criminal law may also simply have a greater con-
sensus around a weaker conception of culpability. Despite the objections
of many scholars, much of Anglo-American criminal law manifests the
idea that causation of harm alone is sometimes sufficient to justify pun-
ishment and quite often sufficient to greatly aggravate punishment for
one who is culpable for some lesser offense. 76 Nonetheless, the intracta-
ble presence of the jury (for the small percentage of cases not resolved by
guilty pleas) seems to play a role as well.
More generally, the recognition that procedural forms such as juries
affect substantive law provides another example of the complex interac-
tions of law, procedure, institutional design, and the background assump-
tions about each. That recalls a familiar peril of comparative legal
analysis: the risk of assessing a single rule or practice among systems
without taking account of the different settings in which they operate.
The same lesson applies to consideration of rules within a single legal
system. Strict liability is not solely a function of normative debates over
whether culpability is required for just punishment or whether that prin-
ciple is trumped by instrumental aims. Strict liability also hinges on,
among other things, faith in the procedures by which we determine
culpability.
76. For an argument to this effect, see Brown, supra note 9.
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